Teen retailing can be a difficult business, and unpredictable for investment analysts who fear the fickle fashion trends of 16-year old girls. The recession turned the teen retail industry on its head, but this wasn’t necessarily bad news for all. Some retailers actually saw significant improvement in sales, some helplessly watched sales fall off a cliff, and some of the retailers with multiple brands targeting different price points weren’t impacted much at all. This is Economics 101, where we learned about how “inferior” goods such as Spam would see increased demand in a weak economy. Now that we have a sense for what store profitability looks like in both a strong and weak economy, we can better understand risk. And uncertainty in the market has created attractive opportunities across the board.
The five companies we’ll compare are Abercrombie (excluding the results of the failed RUEHL concept), American Eagle, Aeropostale, the Gap, and J. Crew:
The main purpose of this analysis is to compare how these stores performed in a strong economy, represented by 2007, and a weak economy, represented by 2009. For starters, we’ll look at some basic operating metrics:
We can see from this data that not all retailers did worse in 2009 than in 2007. Aeropostale and J. Crew generated higher revenue, EBIT, and NI in 2009. The Gap also did well, though revenue was down. Abercrombie did terrible and American Eagle suffered a bit too. I included CFO-D&A as a surrogate FCF measure because the traditional CFO-CapEx cash flow formula isn’t very useful. Each company was aggressively growing store count in 2007. PP&E + Inventory might seem like an unusual metric to use, but these are the key factors in store opening costs. We care about the cash costs to open new stores because this is how each chain will translate profits into growth. Not many companies report what new store opening costs are, but for the ones that do, PP&E + Inventory is a good proxy for that cost. For example, Aeropostale states an average net investment per new 3,600 square foot store is $463k in the 2009 annual report. This compares to my PP&E plus inventory estimate of $404k-423k per store. The discrepancy is justified in part by the fact that average store size has been slowly growing each year.
Looking at these variables on a per-store basis reveals additional information:
The first thing to notice is that revenue per store decreased for every chain except Aeropostale. The sales growth we saw above for the Gap and J. Crew was the result of new store openings, not increased productivity. By comparing the changes in revenue, net income, and cash flow per store, we can rank brands in order of how the weakened economy impacted sales. Aeropostale performed the best, followed by a tie between the Gap and J. Crew, followed by American Eagle, and then finally Abercrombie. This indicates that Aeropostale sells the most inferior goods. We don’t want readers to misunderstand our use of the word “inferior” here. Aeropostale’s products aren’t less good and Aeropostale isn’t a bad company. We’re simply using the word in its economic sense, meaning that as the economy weakens, demand will rise.
Now that we have a sense for what each company spends building new stores and how profitable those stores have been, we can estimate return on invested capital in both a strong and weak economy. The chart below displays this information graphically:
What we see in this chart is that each company was generating RoIC in the range of 20-40% in the strong 2007 economy. In 2009, we see that Aeropostale stores became more profitable while Abercrombie and American Eagle performed poorly. The Gap and J. Crew had somewhat mixed results.
These results bode poorly for Abercrombie. They will do terrible in a weak economy, and perform in-line with peers in a strong economy. Aeropostale will do just fine in a strong economy, and outperform in a weak economy. Profitability aside, the benefits of holding a company like Aeropostale in an investment portfolio are great given the strong negative correlation with the economy in general. So despite the fact that ARO is selling an inferior good, it seems to have a superior market position.
The next step is to compare business prospects to the current share price. Assuming that real store profitability is midway between the cash flow and earnings metrics, we can multiply the per-store earnings in each economic environment to get a high and low estimate for earnings per share. We can then compare that number to the current market cap to see what multiples we’re paying.
A few of these companies appear to have an attractive risk/return tradeoff, especially those on the extreme ends of the pricing spectrum. Investors should be satisfied if American Eagle could generate an 8% earnings yield in a weak economy and a 17% yield in a strong economy. Also, it seems like much of the debate is focused on Abercrombie vs. Aeropostale, with optimists betting on the former and pessimists on the latter. But combining these positions within a portfolio might better position investors for strong returns in any economic environment. At this point readers should be aware that each of these companies is unique and to actually invest in this space requires more work and diligence than is presented here. But we believe this should provide readers not familiar with the teen retail sector a good overview of the opportunities available and a solid framework for further analysis.
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